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  CIA Report 
Exposes 
Drug Smuggling 
Scandal


  By GARY WEBB

  The sale of missiles to the Ayatollah Khomeini, it seems, wasn't the
  real scandal of the Iran-contra affair. It was the sale of cocaine to
  American citizens.

  This we know thanks to a recently declassified CIA inspector
  general's report.

  Though hacked and shredded to about half its original length for
  alleged national security reasons, the 361-page CIA report paints a
  damning picture of official malfeasance.

  Had these secret cables surfaced during the firestorm of controversy
  then raging over Iran-contra, it is likely neither the CIA nor the
  Reagan administration would have survived the conflagration.

  By 1987, the CIA report shows, the agency was sitting on six years'
  worth of reports from field agents, station chiefs, informants,
  private citizens and some of the contras themselves, all indicating
  that Ronald Reagan's "freedom fighters'' were shipping planeloads of
  cocaine and marijuana into the U.S.

  The justice department's files likewise bulged with evidence of
  contra drug-running, including eyewitness testimony from inside
  informants. Ditto for the state department. The CIA had briefed
  vice-president George Bush personally.

  "Allegations of drug trafficking continue to plague our operations,''
  CIA headquarters grumbled in a July 1986 cable to its agents in Costa
  Rica.

  Prime example

  A prime example was international drug kingpin Norwin Meneses, a
  California-based contra who supplied the South-Central L.A. crack
  market with cocaine powder during the 80s and early 90s.

  A 1988 FBI cable shows that the bureau knew Meneses was working for
  the drug enforcement agency (DEA) and believed he "was, and may still
  be, an informant for the Central Intelligence Agency.'' At the time,
  the FBI was unsuccessfully seeking his indictment on federal
  cocaine-trafficking charges.

  According to the report, the CIA not only failed to act against the
  contra traffickers, but also, deliberately or otherwise, misled
  others who were investigating them.

  The agency repeatedly sent false reports to U.S. attorneys, U.S.
  customs and other federal agencies assuring them that the CIA had no
  record of men and companies who were plainly listed in CIA files as
  being involved with drugs.

  Most important, the declassified cables show that the CIA knew
  exactly what it was doing and was fully aware of how the American
  public would react if word of its shenanigans ever surfaced.

  "There is a very real risk that news of our relationship with (Alan
  Hyde), whose reputation as an alleged drug trafficker is widely known
  to various agencies, will hit the public domain -- something that
  could bring our program to a full stop,'' CIA headquarters nervously
  cabled its agents in Honduras in July 1987.

  Six years later, the CIA report says, the agency was still protecting
  Honduran trafficker Hyde in an effort to keep the CIA's relationship
  with drug dealers during the contra war under wraps.

  A March 11, 1993, cable discouraged counter-narcotics efforts against
  Hyde because "his connection to the CIA is well documented and could
  prove difficult in the prosecution stage,'' says the report, which
  was posted on the CIA's Web site in early October.

  The CIA knew from the very beginning of the war that the men it had
  hired to run its main contra army were narco-terrorists, but it
  continued to finance and protect them.

  Contra army

  In September 1981 -- to take just one example -- as the CIA was
  becoming formally involved with the contras, the agency learned that
  a faction called the Legion of September 15 "had made a decision to
  engage in drug smuggling to the United States in order to finance its
  anti-Sandinista operations.''

  A few months after discovering the Legion's involvement with drugs,
  the CIA put the group's senior commanders in charge of the agency's
  newly formed contra organization, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
  (FDN).

  According to the testimony of former L.A. drug kingpin Danilo
  Blandon, the contra middleman who sold Meneses' cocaine to
  South-Central's crack dealers, it was the Legion's commander in
  chief, Enrique Bermudez, who recruited him and Meneses in late 1981
  to raise money for the contras in California.

  As part of their fundraising efforts, they began selling cocaine to
  the street gangs of South-Central and, in the process, helped touch
  off the crack-cocaine explosion there.

  The inspector general's report should put to rest the long-simmering
  historical debate over what the CIA as an institution knew about the
  contras' drug trafficking. The answer? It knew everything, despite
  its best efforts to remain ignorant.

  So where was the watchdog press while the Reagan administration,
  Congress and the CIA were scrambling to keep a lid on the contra drug
  connection? Dishing out the official story as fast as possible.

  Only now -- nearly 12 years later -- can we fully appreciate what an
  astounding lie that was and how eagerly it was swallowed by a
  gullible Washington, DC, press corps.

  While the press was dismissing the issue as the combined fantasies of
  dopers and contra-haters, the DEA was sitting on information from
  several reliable informants -- eyewitnesses on the U.S. government's
  payroll -- who reported that the contras were selling drugs in Los
  Angeles and San Francisco with the CIA's connivance.
 

  DEA operative

  In one case, Ivan Torres, a contra official who was part of Blandon's
  South Central drug ring, told an undercover DEA operative that "CIA
  representatives are aware of his drug-related activities and that
  they don't mind. He said they have gone so far as to as to encourage
  cocaine trafficking by members of the contras because they know it is
  a good source of income.''

  That 1987 DEA report corroborated information the drug agency had
  received two years earlier from Renato Pena, another member of the
  Blandon/Meneses cocaine ring and the FDN's military representative in
  San Francisco.

  In 1985, Pena told the DEA that "the CIA was allowing the contras to
  fly drugs into the United States, sell them and keep the proceeds.''
  Pena told CIA inspectors that "Norwin Meneses and Danilo Blandon told
  him they were raising money for the contras through drug-dealing and
  that Blandon stated that the contras would not have been able to
  operate without drug proceeds."

  Ironically, these recently declassified reports are still secret to
  most Americans.
 

 (c)Copyright 1998 Gary Webb


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